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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This is an appeal in a strict product liability case brought 
by plaintiff George Pavlik, administrator of the estate of 
Stephen Pavlik, a 20 year old man who died as the result 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Judge Becker became Chief Judge as of February 1, 1998. 
 
                                2 
  
of self-administered butane inhalation. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
Keen (World Marketing) Ltd. ("Keen") and Lane 
Limited/Tobacco Exporters International ("Lane"), the 
manufacturer and distributor respectively of "Zeus" brand 
butane fuel, the product that was close-at-hand when 
Stephen collapsed, and which plaintiff alleges to be the 
cause of Stephen's death. The butane was sold in 5.3 ounce 
cans, primarily as fuel for cigarette lighters. The only 
relevant warning, printed on the back panel of the can, 
reads "DO NOT BREATHE SPRAY". The gravamen of the 
plaintiff's claim is that the Zeus brand can is defective 
because this warning inadequately warns potential users 
like Stephen Pavlik of the extreme hazards of butane 
inhalation. 
 
The district court held that the plaintiff's failure to warn 
claim fails for two reasons. First, the court determined that 
there was insufficient evidence in the record to prove that 
Stephen actually inhaled from the Zeus can on the night of 
his death, as opposed to the "Clipper" brand butane cans 
subsequently found buried in his bureau drawer. 
Alternatively, the court concluded that Stephen was already 
aware of the dangers of serious bodily injury associated 
with inhaling butane, and that a more specific warning 
would not have affected his conduct. The court reasoned 
that the alleged inadequate warning was therefore not the 
proximate cause of Stephen's injury. The court based this 
latter conclusion primarily on the fact that Stephen had 
also purchased and used cans of Clipper brand butane and 
therefore was presumed to have had notice of Clipper's 
more detailed warning. 
 
We believe that both of these conclusions are flawed. 
First, there is scientific evidence in the record that the 
onset of Stephen's ultimately fatal reaction to the butane 
fumes could have been quite sudden, which, combined with 
evidence that only the Zeus can was in close proximity to 
him at the time the injury occurred, would permit a jury to 
infer that Stephen had in fact inhaled from the Zeus can. 
Second, we conclude that plaintiff has raised genuine 
issues of material fact on the defendant's proximate cause 
challenge. 
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Under Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191 
(3d Cir. 1987), to succeed in their causation defense, 
defendants must demonstrate that Stephen was fully aware 
of the risk of bodily injury posed by Zeus butane prior to 
the accident. Plaintiff, however, has successfully 
undermined defendants' claim that the text of the Zeus and 
Clipper warnings provided sufficient notice to break the 
causal chain, and he has identified genuine issues of fact 
concerning alleged warnings given by Stephen's mother, the 
other evidence on which defendants' rely. In the absence of 
direct evidence about Stephen's knowledge of the serious 
consequences of butane inhalation, and given the 
inconclusiveness of what Stephen's mother is purported to 
have told him, there is a genuine issue of material fact on 
the causation issue, and hence we will reverse and remand 
with respect to the product liability claim. 
 
We do, however, affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on plaintiff's intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim. We agree with the district court 
that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support 
a conclusion that defendants' conduct in this matter has 
been extreme and outrageous, the standard under 
Pennsylvania law for establishing that tort. 
 
I. Background Facts and Procedural History 
 
On April 10, 1994, at about 2:30 a.m., plaintiff George 
Pavlik was asleep on his sofa when he was awakened by 
the sound of his twenty-year-old son, Stephen, arriving 
home after having spent the evening with his sister and 
friends. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Pavlik heard a loud"thud" 
coming from an upstairs room. When he investigated this 
unusual sound, Pavlik found Stephen lying on thefloor of 
his bedroom, gasping for breath. Pavlik immediately called 
the police and began to perform CPR. Paramedics soon 
arrived and unsuccessfully attempted to revive Stephen. He 
was pronounced dead later that morning. 
 
The coroner listed the cause of Stephen's death as 
cardiac dysrhythmia complicating abusive hydrocarbon 
inhalation. It is uncontroverted that this was the result of 
Stephen's intentional inhalation of butane gas. At the time 
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of his death, a canister of Zeus brand butane was found 
atop Stephen's bedroom bureau. Warning language on the 
front of the Zeus can reads: 
 
       DANGER 
       CONTENTS EXTREMELY FLAMMABLE 
       READ CAREFULLY OTHER CAUTIONS ON THE BACK 
       PANEL 
 
The warning label on the back panel of the can reads: 
 
       PRESSURIZED CONTAINER: 
       PROTECT FROM SUNLIGHT AND DO NOT EXPOSE TO 
       TEMPERATURE EXCEEDING 120F. DO NOT PIERCE 
       OR BURN, EVEN AFTER USE. DO NOT SPRAY ON A 
       NAKED FLAME OR ANY INCANDESCENT MATERIAL. 
       DO NOT USE NEAR FIRE OR FLAME OR WHILST 
       SMOKING. 
       DO NOT BREATHE SPRAY 
       KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN 
 
Shortly after Stephen's death, Mr. and Mrs. Pavlik searched 
their son's room and found seven more cans of butane 
hidden under Stephen's underwear in a drawer of the 
bureau. Five of these cans were Zeus brand butane, and 
the other two bore the Clipper brand name. The back panel 
of the Clipper can warns: 
 
       CAUTION: 
       PRESSURIZED CONTAINER. PROTECT FROM 
       SUNLIGHT AND DO NOT EXPOSE TEMPERATURE 
       EXCEEDING 50C. DO NOT PIERCE OR BURN, EVEN 
       AFTER USE. DO NOT SPRAY ONTO A NAKED FLAME 
       OR ANY INCANDESCENT MATERIAL. 
 
       USE ONLY DIRECT FILLING 
 
       AEROSOL PRODUCT 
       UN 1950 
       LIGHTER REFILL 
       CONTAINS BUTANE 
 
       FLAMMABLE KEEP AWAY FROM SOURCES OF 
       IGNITION-NO SMOKING. 
       KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN DELIBERATELY 
       INHALING THE CONTENTS MAY BE HARMFUL OR 
       EVEN FATAL. 
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In contrast to the Zeus can, the Clipper front panel 
contains no additional warning or language directing the 
user to consult the back panel. 
 
Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against Lane, the United 
States distributor of Zeus brand butane, alleging strict 
product liability for failure to warn and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Lane joined Keen as a third-party 
defendant. The manufacturer of Clipper brand butane is 
not a party to this lawsuit. 
 
Following discovery, defendants moved for summary 
judgment. According to the defendants, Stephen's allegedly 
fatal inhalation was not his first attempt at inhaling 
butane. Rather, they characterize Stephen's conduct as an 
attempt to "get high" in deliberate disregard of all warnings. 
They contend that, on at least two prior occasions, Stephen 
had been caught in the act by his mother, and that on both 
occasions she had warned him that his abuse of butane 
was dangerous. Additionally, they contend that Mrs. Pavlik 
had threatened Stephen in 1992 that he would be thrown 
out of the family home if he continued his butane abuse. 
Accordingly, defendants argued that plaintiff could not 
establish that the alleged inadequate warning was the 
cause-in-fact and proximate cause of Stephen's death. 
Defendants further claimed that their conduct in allegedly 
failing to provide an adequate warning was not sufficiently 
extreme and outrageous to permit recovery for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 
The district court granted the summary judgment motion 
on both counts. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was 
denied, and this timely appeal followed. The district court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332. We have appellate 
jurisdiction over a final order of the district court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We set forth our familiar plenary 
standard of review of a grant of summary judgment in the 
margin.1 We explain the facts bearing on the present 
motion in greater detail infra. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(noting plenary standard of review). The motion should be granted if "the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
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II. The Failure to Warn Claim 
 
A. Section 402A 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, whose law we are 
bound to follow as a court exercising diversity jurisdiction, 
has adopted S 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which imposes strict liability on the purveyor of a product 
in a defective condition "unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer." See Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 
1966). Under S 402A, an otherwise properly designed 
product may still be unreasonably dangerous (and therefore 
"defective") for strict liability purposes if the product is 
distributed without sufficient warnings to apprise the 
ultimate user of the latent dangers in the product. See 
Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186, 190 (Pa. 1997). 
 
To recover under S 402A, a plaintiff must establish: (1) 
that the product was defective; (2) that the defect was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; and (3) that the 
defect causing the injury existed at the time the product left 
the seller's hands. See id. (citing Berkebile v. Brantly 
Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 899 (Pa. 1975)). In the 
context of a failure to warn case, to satisfy the second 
prong, the plaintiff must establish that it was the total lack 
or insufficiency of a warning that was both a cause-in-fact 
and the proximate cause of the injuries. See Greiner v. 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselleschaft, 540 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 
1976); Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 
1984). While the question of causation in Pennsylvania is 
normally for the jury, "if the relevant facts are not in 
dispute and the remoteness of the causal connection 
between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The non-moving party 
must adduce evidence "sufficient to establish the existence of [every] 
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986). In evaluating the sufficiency of this evidence, we must grant all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence to the non-moving party. See 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
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injury clearly appears, the question becomes one of law." 
Conti, 743 F.2d at 197-98 (quoting Liney v. Chestnut 
Motors, Inc., 218 A.2d 336, 338 (Pa. 1966)). 
 
To reach a jury on a failure to warn theory of liability, the 
evidence must be such as to support a reasonable 
inference, rather than a guess, that the existence of an 
adequate warning might have prevented the injury. See id. 
at 197. As we develop infra, the plaintiff enjoys the benefit 
of a rebuttable presumption that an adequate warning 
would have been heeded if it had been provided; however, 
one way the defendant can rebut this presumption is by 
demonstrating that the plaintiff was previously fully aware 
of the risk of bodily injury posed by the product. The 
district court agreed with defendants that such a prior 
awareness did exist in this case and that there was 
insufficient evidence in the record to support a reasonable 
inference that an adequate warning on the Zeus can might 
have prevented Stephen Pavlik's death. Additionally, the 
court held that plaintiff's S 402A claim fails for lack of 
causation because there was insufficient evidence 
demonstrating that Stephen even inhaled from the Zeus 
can on the morning of April 10, 1994. We consider both 
arguments below. 
 
B. Did Stephen Inhale from the Zeus Can? 
 
The district court held that summary judgment was 
appropriate because a jury would have to speculate that it 
was the Zeus can (as opposed to a Clipper can) from which 
Stephen inhaled on the night of his death. The court found 
that the only evidence in the record indicating that Stephen 
inhaled Zeus butane was the fact that a Zeus can was 
found on his bureau, while all the Clipper cans (plus other 
Zeus cans) were found buried in his bureau drawer, and 
that this alone was insufficient to create a genuine jury 
question. We disagree. 
 
Plaintiff points out that the onset of Stephen Pavlik's fatal 
reaction had to have been sudden, and thus it was more 
likely than not that he would neither have had the time nor 
the wherewithal to bury the can that he actually had used 
in his bureau drawer. Thus, plaintiff reasons that Stephen 
must have inhaled from the Zeus can. As noted supra, we 
 
                                8 
  
must grant all reasonable inferences from the evidence in 
favor of the non-moving party; moreover there is evidence 
in the record that buttresses plaintiff's claim. For example, 
an article attached to the affidavit of Earl Siegel, Pharm.D., 
describes the potential for "sudden sniffing death" caused 
by butane abuse.2 See App. at 359-60. In addition, the 
report prepared by Thomas J. Wallace, Ph.D., states that 
"[d]efendants are well aware of the negative consequences 
of Butane abuse and the fact that it can cause instant 
death." App. at 353. Although this evidence might not 
persuade a jury that Stephen's death was caused by the 
Zeus can, the inference plaintiff would have us draw is both 
logical and reasonable. One could reasonably (and easily) 
infer from these reports that it is more likely than not that 
it was the nearby Zeus can that triggered Stephen's death. 
Therefore, the district court should not have granted 
summary judgment on this ground. 
 
C. Would a Better Zeus Warning Have Deterred Stephen 
       Pavlik? 
 
The defendants' second argument in support of a grant of 
summary judgment in their favor is considerably more 
complicated. They contend (and the district court found) 
that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support 
a reasonable inference that a different warning on the Zeus 
canister would have led Stephen Pavlik to act differently. 
According to the defendants, Stephen had been previously 
warned of the dangers of butane inhalation from three 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In his brief to this court, plaintiff also cites a January 13, 1997, 
letter- 
report by Dr. Siegel which states that inhalation of butane can cause 
death "within minutes". Appendix at 357. However, this document was 
not in the record when the district court decided the defendant's 
summary judgment motion. Plaintiff did attach the letter to his motion 
for reconsideration in the district court, but under our rule in Harsco 
Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985), when evidence is not 
newly discovered, a party may not submit that evidence in support of a 
motion to reconsider a grant of summary judgment. Since Dr. Siegel's 
testimony was available (indeed, he even provided an affidavit which was 
attached as an exhibit) prior to the filing of the plaintiff's original 
answer 
to the defendant's summary judgment motion, the January 13 letter 
should not have been considered in the motion for reconsideration and 
will not be considered here. 
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sources: (1) the warning on the Zeus can; (2) the warning 
on the Clipper can; and (3) his mother. Based on these 
combined warnings, the defendants contend that Stephen 
was already aware of the dangers associated with butane 
inhalation when he decided to inhale the contents of the 
Zeus can on the night of his death. The district court 
agreed and held that, even assuming that the Zeus warning 
was inadequate, there was no evidence in the record that 
an adequate warning would have had any deterrent value. 
 
In support of their claim, the defendants rely on Conti, 
supra; Overpeck v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 634 F. 
Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 
1987); and Powell v. J.T. Posey Co., 766 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 
1985). In all three of these cases, we concluded that the 
allegedly defective lack of an adequate warning could not 
have proximately caused the victim's injuries. In Conti and 
Overpeck, there was evidence in the record that the victim 
was already aware of the complained of danger prior to the 
time of the injury. In Powell, while the victim was not aware 
of the specific danger at issue prior to her injury, there was 
no evidence in the record that she would have changed her 
course of conduct had she been provided with the warning 
she sought, and, in fact, there was evidence specifically 
suggesting the contrary. The defendants nonetheless 
submit that the facts here compel the same conclusion we 
reached in Conti, Overpeck and Powell. 
 
1. Proximate Cause in Failure to Warn Cases 
 
Our precedents in this area of the law teach that, in a 
failure to warn case, we focus our causation analysis on the 
additional precautions that might have been taken by the 
end user had the allegedly defective warning been different. 
See Powell, 766 F.2d at 135. This analysis requires the fact 
finder at trial or a court on summary judgment to"consider 
not only what did occur, but also what might have occurred 
. . . . Such a determination as to what might have happened 
necessarily requires a weighing of probabilities." Remy v. 
Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 571 A.2d 446, 449-50 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990) (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 
1286-87 (Pa. 1978)) (emphasis in original), aff'd sub nom. 
Kimco Dev. Corp. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 637 A.2d 
603 (Pa. 1993). 
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Comment j to S 402A is directed in part to this weighing 
process, providing that "[w]here a warning is given, the 
seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and 
heeded." Generally speaking, comment j sets forth a 
presumption that works in favor of the manufacturer or 
seller of a product where an adequate warning has been 
provided.3 See Coffman v. Keene Corp., 608 A.2d 416, 421 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) ("Coffman I"), aff'd, 628 
A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993) ("Coffman II"); Technical Chemical Co. 
v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). From this, it 
follows logically that the law should also presume that, 
when no warning or an inadequate warning is provided, the 
end-user would have read and heeded an adequate warning 
had one been given by the manufacturer. See Coffman I, 
608 A.2d at 421 (collecting cases following this logic); Wolfe 
v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1978) (holding that the failure to give an adequate warning 
"permits the inference that it would have alerted the user to 
the danger and forestalled the accident."); but cf. Coffman 
II, 628 A.2d at 717-18 (extension of comment j based more 
on public policy than logic). Indeed, many jurisdictions 
have construed comment j to provide just such a 
presumption, referred to generally as the "heeding 
presumption". See Coffman II, 628 A.2d at 720 (collecting 
cases); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Failure to Warn as 
Basis of Liability Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 53 
A.L.R.3d 239 (1974). This presumption assists the failure to 
warn plaintiff in satisfying his burden of showing proximate 
cause. See Coffman II, 628 A.2d at 719. 
 
While comment j has been adopted in Pennsylvania, see 
Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971), to date the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly decided 
whether the heeding presumption would apply under 
Pennsylvania's interpretation of S 402A. On two prior 
occasions we have discussed this question without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It should be noted, however, that the comment j presumption will not 
apply in those cases in which it is alleged that the warning provided, 
while substantively adequate, suffers from communicative deficiencies 
(e.g. small or otherwise illegible type) and is thus unlikely to convey 
its 
danger message to the user. We discuss this aspect of comment j infra 
at pages 18-19. 
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predicting how the Court would rule, see Petree, 831 F.2d 
at 1196 n.2, Overpeck, 823 F.2d at 756 & n.4; in those 
cases, we found that even if the heeding presumption 
existed, the defendants would have successfully rebutted it. 
 
We now predict that Pennsylvania would adopt a 
rebuttable heeding presumption as a logical corollary to 
comment j. Since the very idea of imposing strict liability 
for the failure to warn is premised on the belief that the 
presence or absence of an adequate warning label will affect 
the conduct of a product user, it would be illogical, and 
contrary to the basic policy of S 402A, to accept that a 
product sold without an adequate warning is in a "defective 
condition", see Incollingo, while simultaneously rejecting the 
presumption that the user would have heeded the warning 
had it been given. Indeed, in its most recent (albeit limited) 
discussion of comment j, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
stated plainly that "the law presumes that warnings will be 
obeyed." Davis, 690 A.2d at 190. We predict, therefore, that 
Pennsylvania would agree that "[c]omment j provides ample 
support for application of the rebuttable `heeding' 
presumption . . . to assist a plaintiff in proving the absence 
of a warning proximately caused harm." Coffman, 608 A.2d 
at 422. 
 
While the heeding presumption benefits a failure to warn 
plaintiff, it does not change the fact that he still bears the 
burden of persuasion on the causation prong of his S 402A 
claim. Accordingly, as we recognized in Petree and 
Overpeck, the heeding presumption must be rebuttable, 
and thus "[w]hen the opponent of the presumption has met 
the burden of production thus imposed . . . the office of the 
presumption has been performed; the presumption is of no 
further effect and drops from the case." Overpeck, 823 F.2d 
at 756 (citing Commonwealth v. Vogel, 268 A.2d 89 (Pa. 
1970)). To get past the presumption and to a jury, the 
opponent of the presumption need only introduce evidence 
"sufficient to support a finding contrary to the presumed 
fact." See McCormick on Evidence S 344 (3d ed. 1984). 
 
Applied to the present case, this means that if Lane and 
Keen can introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that Stephen Pavlik was "fully aware of the risk of bodily 
injury, or the extent to which [his] conduct could contribute 
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to that risk, so as to be legally chargeable with the 
consequences," see Petree, 831 F.2d at 1196, then the 
presumption would be successfully rebutted and the 
burden of production would shift back to Pavlik to come 
forward with evidence demonstrating that an adequate 
warning would have changed Stephen's behavior. At that 
point, "only the facts or actual evidence from which the 
presumption arose remain, free from any artificial effect, to 
be considered along with other evidence." See Lynn v. 
Cepurneek, 508 A.2d 308, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(discussing general law of presumptions in Pennsylvania); 9 
Wigmore on Evidence S 2487; cf. Overpeck, 823 F.2d at 756 
& n.3 (Where "an inference that a warning would have 
reminded a user of a known danger is unsupported by 
independent evidence, such an inference is impermissible 
as mere jury speculation."). 
 
To prevail on summary judgment, however, defendants 
must satisfy a more substantial burden. While they need 
only produce evidence sufficient to support afinding 
contrary to the presumed fact to rebut the presumption at 
trial, see supra, to satisfy Rule 56 the record must show 
that a reasonable fact finder would be bound tofind that 
Stephen Pavlik was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury; 
otherwise, we are presented with a genuine issue of fact for 
the jury. With this standard in mind, we turn now to 
determine whether the evidence cited by the defendants is 
sufficient to establish (to the extent just described) that 
Stephen Pavlik was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury 
posed by butane inhalation prior to his accident. 
 
2. Mrs. Pavlik's Warnings 
 
There is evidence in the record indicating that Stephen 
Pavlik's mother, who passed away approximately one year 
after Stephen's death, knew that her son had inhaled 
butane on at least two prior occasions, once in 1992 and 
again in 1994. The coroner's certificate of identification, for 
example, states that Mrs. Pavlik had caught Stephen 
inhaling butane about two years before his death, though 
she believed that he had since stopped. App. at 290. 
Stephen's sister, Theresa, also testified that Mrs. Pavlik had 
caught Stephen "doing something that's not right" with two 
cans of butane sometime in 1992, and that Mrs. Pavlik had 
 
                                13 
  
told Stephen that if he continued, he would be thrown out 
of the house. App. at 302-04. 
 
In addition, Denise Johnson, a friend of Stephen's, 
testified that Mrs. Pavlik had informed her that she had 
caught Stephen inhaling butane: 
 
       A:  . . . after Stephen's death, she had told me that he 
           had used it previously. 
       Q:  Who's the "she"? 
       A:  Mrs. Pavlik. 
           . . . 
       Q:  Was the topic of the use of the butane discussed 
           [between you and Mrs. Pavlik] a lot? 
       A:  No, not a lot, no. A couple times, but not a lot. 
           . . . 
       Q:  Did Mrs. Pavlik indicate exactly what she said to, 
           like her son when she caught him? 
       A:  I believe she did, but I can't remember exact words. 
           You know, it was a really long time ago. 
       Q:  Do you remember any words to the effect that, 
           "The stuff 's dangerous"? 
       A:  Of course, yes. 
 
Supplemental Appendix at 75b-77b.4 It is this statement 
upon which the defendants rely to show that Mrs. Pavlik 
had warned Stephen of the dangers of butane inhalation. 
 
This evidence, however, is not uncontroverted. Theresa 
Pavlik consistently testified that Mrs. Pavlik did not know 
specifically what Stephen was doing with the cans of 
butane when the alleged 1992 incident occurred: 
 
       Q: Did your mother ever ask you what is your brother 
          doing with these cans? 
       A: Not that I remember. 
       Q: Did your mother ever indicate that she found out 
          what your brother was doing with these cans? 
       A: Specifically, no. 
       Q: Did your mother say, "I think he was inhaling or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is unclear from the briefs and the deposition transcripts in the 
record to which of the two (or possibly other) occasions noted above 
Denise Johnson's testimony refers. 
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          ingesting this material?" 
       A: No sir, not that I remember. 
       Q: Wasn't there any conversation between you and 
          your mother as to what your brother was doing 
          with this material? 
       A: Yes sir, there was. She was not sure exactly what 
          it was that he was doing with them. She just had 
          a feeling that it just was not right, whatever it was 
          he was doing with it. 
       Q: And did you indicate or did you suggest anything 
          as to what he may be doing with this material? 
       A: Not that I remember. 
 
App. at 304-05. As for the second incident, in 1994, 
Theresa Pavlik testified that neither she nor her mother 
specifically confronted Stephen about butane inhalation at 
that time: 
 
       Q: When you spoke to your mother in January of`94, 
          did she indicate that this was only the second time 
          she ever heard this laughing, the first time being 
          about -- 
       A: Yes, sir. 
       Q: -- a year and a couple months earlier? 
       A: Yes, sir. 
          . . . 
       Q: Did she indicate that she spoke to her son again? 
       A: No, sir, not that I remember. 
 
App. 307-08. 
 
It is tempting to superimpose upon the record our own 
street-wise assumption that everyone knows the dangers 
(and warning signs) of butane abuse. But, as judges, we 
cannot do so. Since we must decide whether Stephen Pavlik 
was fully aware of the danger of bodily harm posed by 
butane inhalation, and since there may be degrees of 
apprehension of danger with respect to the seriousness of 
harm, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiffs, we cannot agree with defendants that it is 
beyond dispute that Mrs. Pavlik's warning was sufficient to 
break the causal chain. The jury may well find for 
defendants, but it is a question for the jury. 
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First of all, while it appears that Mrs. Pavlik gave some 
warning to Stephen, it is uncertain what the content of that 
warning was. Next, since the content of Mrs. Pavlik's 
warning is unclear, we cannot conclusively determine 
whether it was adequate to put Stephen on notice of the 
full extent of the risk of bodily injury, see Petree, supra, 
posed by butane inhalation. Indeed, there is also a genuine 
issue of material fact whether Mrs. Pavlik even knew what 
Stephen was doing with the butane cans -- and hence 
whether she was even capable of providing Stephen with 
sufficient knowledge of the danger at issue. 
 
Theresa Pavlik's testimony that Mrs. Pavlik had said "the 
stuff's dangerous," is an insufficient basis for us to decide 
as a matter of law that Stephen was sufficiently warned of 
the danger at issue prior to his fatal inhalation, and 
therefore that the heeding presumption has been rebutted. 
This statement provides no more information than the 
warning on the Zeus can that a user should not "breathe 
spray." Indeed, it may actually provide less information, 
since Mrs. Pavlik's admonition does not relate what exactly 
about the butane is dangerous and/or what uses of the 
product would be dangerous. Below we consider whether a 
different result is commanded when we consider this 
evidence in conjunction with the warnings on the Clipper 
and Zeus cans. 
 
3. The Clipper and Zeus Warnings 
 
The defendants also argue that Stephen had the type of 
adequate prior knowledge of the danger at hand that we 
found in Conti and Overpeck, supra, because he had read 
the warnings on the Clipper and Zeus cans prior to his fatal 
inhalation. As we have noted throughout, to fall within the 
scope of these cases, the record must demonstrate that 
Stephen was fully aware of the risk of bodily injury posed 
by butane inhalation. See Petree, supra . We deal first with 
the Zeus warning. As a matter of basic logic, the 
defendants' argument that Stephen read the Zeus label and 
therefore a more detailed warning would not have altered 
his course of conduct is not really a claim about causation 
at all, but is a claim about the ultimate issue in this case 
-- the adequacy of the existing Zeus warning under S 402A. 
 
                                16 
  
The initial determination of whether a warning is 
adequate in Pennsylvania is a matter of law. See Nowak v. 
Faberge USA, Inc., 32 F.3d 755, 757 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'g, 
812 F. Supp. 492 (M.D. Pa. 1992); Davis, supra. Since, as 
we develop below, we discern a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the adequacy of the Clipper warning, and 
since we believe that Clipper more adequately warns of the 
danger of using butane as an inhalant than does the Zeus 
can, we cannot conclude that Stephen's awareness of the 
Zeus label provides a reason for finding no causation. To 
the contrary, based on the present record, we have serious 
doubts that the Zeus warning sufficiently warns users of 
the potentially fatal consequences of butane inhalation, and 
we are not convinced of its adequacy under S 402A. More 
specifically, the "DO NOT BREATHE SPRAY" warning 
appears to give the user no notice of the serious nature of 
the danger posed by inhalation, intentional or otherwise, 
and no other language on the Zeus can does so. Yet, we 
similarly cannot find that such a directive is inadequate as 
a matter of law, and so we must leave the question for the 
jury.5 
 
The present case does not, however, present the typical 
manner in which the adequacy of a warning becomes an 
issue. Normally, it is only the warning on the defendant's 
product -- here, Zeus brand butane -- whose adequacy 
courts are called upon to consider. The twist in this case is 
that the defendants and the district court have also made 
the adequacy of the Clipper warning a central issue by 
virtue of their proximate cause analysis. While the district 
court did not make a formal finding regarding the legal 
adequacy of the Clipper warning, it is apparent that its 
proximate cause analysis incorporated a belief that the 
Clipper warning would itself be adequate for S 402A 
purposes. 
 
The Clipper warning states, in small capital letters on the 
back panel of the can, "Deliberately inhaling the contents 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We make clear, however, that this conclusion presupposes that the 
district court will first engage in the necessary Azzarello analysis. See 
Nowak, 32 F.3d at 757 (citing Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A.2d 
1020, 1025-27 (Pa. 1978). 
 
                                17 
  
may be harmful or even fatal."6 The district court presumed 
that Stephen Pavlik had read this warning because Stephen 
had "apparently inhaled" Clipper brand butane at some 
point. The basis for this inference is the fact that several 
Clipper cans were found in Stephen's bureau drawer. Since 
we must draw all inferences in favor of plaintiff, the non- 
moving party, it cannot be conclusively determined that 
Stephen inhaled Clipper butane from that fact alone. We 
agree, however, that it is reasonable to infer that Stephen 
had previously used the Clipper product in some manner or 
other. 
 
As we have explained, it is normally presumed, pursuant 
to comment j, that when an individual uses a product he or 
she has read and heeded any warning labels attached to 
that product. However, there is an exception to this 
presumption, implicit in cases that hold that the victim's 
actual failure to read a warning label does not necessarily 
bar recovery "where the plaintiff is challenging the 
adequacy of the efforts of the manufacturer to communicate 
the dangers of the product to the buyer or user." Nowak, 
supra, 812 F. Supp. at 498; see also Baldino v. Castagna, 
478 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa. 1984) (holding that drug 
manufacturer can breach duty of reasonable care by 
promoting product in such a way as to nullify printed 
warnings). That is, in cases where the alleged failure to 
warn is based on claims that a warning was given but was, 
for example, printed in small or unreadable type, the 
comment j presumption should not apply so as to compel 
a verdict for the defendant. This is because manufacturers 
cannot rely upon a presumption that the victim read a 
warning to shield themselves from liability for warnings 
that are inadequate precisely because they are not 
presented in a manner sufficient to attract the user's 
attention. See id. 
 
In the present case, the inadequacies of the Clipper 
warning alleged by plaintiff are both substantive (i.e. the 
warning does not adequately describe the danger posed) 
and communicative (i.e. the warning does not command the 
attention of the user). To demonstrate the problems with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The full text of the Clipper warning label is set forth in Part I, 
supra. 
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the Clipper warning, plaintiff primarily relies upon a report 
by E. Patrick McGuire, who is offered as a warnings expert. 
McGuire concludes that the Clipper warning is defective for 
the following reasons: 
 
       1) The inhalant danger is not listed on the front panel 
       of the can, despite the fact that this is one of the 
       "primary biological hazards associated with the 
       foreseeable use of this product"; 
       2) The warning fails to specifically warn of the 
       dangers of concentrating the product -- i.e. the 
       prohibitions about breathing the "contents" of the 
       can are misleading such that some readers "will 
       interpret this admonition to mean that a harmful 
       dosage level is only reached if the entire can is 
       inhaled"; 
       3) The warning is set in conditional language, as 
       opposed to stating that inhalation is "likely" to 
       produce a fatal reaction. 
 
App. at 329. McGuire's opinion raises genuine issues of fact 
about the adequacy of the Clipper warning. On a 
substantive level, we can reasonably infer from McGuire's 
second and third critiques set forth above that even if 
Stephen Pavlik had read the Clipper warning, he would not 
have adequately been fully warned of the danger of bodily 
harm posed by butane inhalation. 
 
But even if the warning was substantively sound, that 
might not be enough, for the case law suggests that factors 
such as the placement and size of warning labels should 
also be considered. The opinion of the district court in 
Nowak, supra, surveyed the cases discussing these factors 
and found that: 
 
       A manufacturer may be liable for failure to adequately 
       warn where its warning is not prominent, and not 
       calculated to attract the user's attention to the true 
       nature of the danger due to its position, size, or 
       coloring of its lettering. A warning may be found to be 
       inadequate if its size or print is too small or 
       inappropriately located on the product. The warning 
       must be sufficient to catch the attention of persons 
       who could be expected to use the product, to apprise 
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       them of its dangers, and to advise them of the 
       measures to take to avoid these dangers. 
 
Nowak, 812 F. Supp. at 497 (citations omitted). Although 
our opinion on appeal in Nowak affirmed the verdict and 
judgment of the district court, see Nowak, 32 F.3d at 759, 
we did not expressly adopt this portion of the district 
court's analysis. We do so here. 
 
Following Nowak, we could also conclude from McGuire's 
testimony that the Clipper warning was insufficient to 
"catch the attention" of Stephen Pavlik. As McGuire noted 
in his report, the Clipper warning is listed on the back 
panel of the can. It is printed in relatively small type, of the 
same font, color, and size as the instructions for use. 
Indeed, we note that against the bright yellow label 
background, the non-highlighted, black text of the warning, 
in which the admonitions about avoiding extreme 
temperatures, flammability, and keeping the product away 
from children, run directly into the warning about 
inhalation, may appear as a blur to the average user. 
 
Thus, drawing all inferences from the record in plaintiff's 
favor, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
whether the Clipper warning was sufficient to catch 
Stephen Pavlik's attention and, by its terms, render an 
additional warning on the Zeus can unnecessary. We reach 
this conclusion regardless of whether we can apply 
comment j and presume that Stephen read the warning (in 
which case plaintiff 's expert testimony suggests that it is 
substantively deficient), or whether the exception discussed 
supra applies (in which case plaintiff has introduced 
sufficient evidence of communicative inadequacies to raise 
a question for the jury). 
 
The defendants have pointed to no specific evidence in 
the record that would render the Clipper warning sufficient 
to defeat causation. Instead, defendants argue in their 
briefs that Stephen Pavlik "deliberately disregarded" the 
Clipper and Zeus warnings "in an attempt to misuse a 
product for the sole purpose of getting high." While a jury 
could certainly find the Clipper warning adequate and 
reach this conclusion, the defendants do not cite to 
evidence in the record demonstrating that a reasonable jury 
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could not find otherwise. Although we have thus far 
considered defendants' evidence of the three possible 
sources of Stephen's prior knowledge separately, we make 
clear that even considering the evidence of the Clipper 
warning in conjunction with the evidence of Mrs. Pavlik's 
alleged warnings and the (otherwise inadequate) Zeus 
warning, we are not persuaded that the defendants have 
met their burden of rebutting the comment j heeding 
presumption to the extent necessary to warrant summary 
judgment. 
 
Our conclusions here are not contrary to the results or 
rationales of Conti, Overpeck, or Powell, cases relied upon 
by defendants. Both Overpeck and Conti were concerned 
with reminder warnings -- that is, those cases dealt with 
the question whether an additional warning by the 
manufacturer was needed when there was undisputed proof 
that the victim was at one time aware of the specific danger 
posed by the product. In Conti, the plaintiff was injured as 
she was entering the passenger side of her husband's car. 
The husband had failed to disengage the clutch when he 
started the car and, as a result, it lurched backwards, 
injuring the plaintiff as she tried to enter. Plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant's failure to place a warning about 
disengaging the clutch in the car's interior caused the 
injury, and a jury agreed. 
 
After the district court denied Ford's post-trial motion for 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court 
reversed. We determined that the issue of causation should 
have been decided in the defendant's favor as a matter of 
law. Mr. Conti had testified that he knew that in"driving a 
standard transmission you would have to depress the 
clutch," and testified that he had read the portion of the 
Owner's Manual to his car which stated "[o]n manual 
transmission vehicles, depress the clutch pedal and place 
the gear shift lever in the neutral position." Conti, 743 F.2d 
at 198. In light of these admissions of actual awareness of 
the danger, which would rebut the comment j heeding 
presumption, we discerned no evidence in the record to 
suggest that Mr. Conti would have paid any greater 
attention to what he was doing when starting the car if 
additional warnings had been contained in the operator's 
manual or on a sticker in the car. See id. at 198-99. 
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In Overpeck, the plaintiff was injured when a tire 
mounting tool manufactured by the defendant became 
disengaged from a tire and struck him in the eye. The 
 780<!>plaintiff brought suit alleging, inter alia, that the 
manufacturer had failed to adequately warn him of this 
danger. The jury found for the plaintiff, but the district 
court granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict concluding that the record was devoid of evidence 
directly establishing that any warning would have caused 
the plaintiff to act differently. We affirmed. See Overpeck, 
823 F.2d at 757. This conclusion was based on the fact 
that while Overpeck had apparently received no formal 
advance warning, he specifically testified that he was aware 
that the mounting tool might fly off during operation. See 
id. at 755-56. In fact, he further indicated that he knew 
how to prevent the precise injury caused in that case. See 
id. Thus, we concluded that any additional warning would 
have provided plaintiff with no new information, and"thus 
would not logically have affected his behavior." Id. at 755. 
 
In this case, we are not presented with similarly 
uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that Stephen Pavlik 
was aware at the time of his accident that inhaling butane 
could cause sudden death or serious bodily harm. Unlike 
Conti and Overpeck, we have no direct testimony 
demonstrating the victim's knowledge. We only have 
evidence before us that Mrs. Pavlik may have warned 
Stephen (the content and adequacy of which is unclear and 
hence in dispute), and, at most, the possibility, see S 402A 
cmt. j, that he read a Clipper warning whose adequacy is 
likewise at issue. Unlike Overpeck and Conti, therefore, we 
are not dealing solely with the narrow question whether 
there is independent evidence demonstrating that a 
reminder warning would have made a difference. In this 
case, there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether 
Stephen Pavlik was adequately warned in the first instance 
(i.e. was inhalation known to pose a danger of bodily harm), 
and thus whether the heeding presumption has been 
rebutted. 
 
Moreover, and more importantly, we held in Petree that 
the user's mere awareness of a hazard does not establish 
that the user was fully aware of the risk of serious bodily 
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injury, such that the user should be legally accountable. 
See Petree, 831 F.2d at 1196. In that case, the plaintiff was 
injured when he was struck in the face by a steel bar which 
was ejected from a hydraulic press being operated by his 
fellow employee. The plaintiff alleged that the hydraulic 
press was defective for lack of a warning regarding the 
possibility that it could forcefully eject pieces of scrap 
metal. See id. at 1192. Although there was evidence in the 
record from the operator of the press and others indicating 
some prior awareness of the complained of danger, we 
found that the evidence did not demonstrate an awareness 
of "the full extent that an adequate warning might have 
provided," and thus held that the failure to warn claim 
should have gone to the jury. See id. at 1196-97. Similarly, 
in the present case the defendants' evidence does not 
demonstrate that a reasonable jury could only conclude 
that Stephen Pavlik was fully aware of the extreme nature 
of the consequences he faced when he chose to inhale 
butane. 
 
The injury to the victims in Conti and Overpeck did not 
result in death, the result that befell Stephen Pavlik here. 
While our decision in those cases turned on deposition 
testimony by the victims, defendants here obviously did not 
have the opportunity to depose Stephen Pavlik and 
determine what his exact level of knowledge was at the time 
the injury occurred. However this is a distinction without a 
difference, for it is not the mere lack of direct testimony by 
the victim (which would be missing in any products case 
resulting in death) that distinguishes this case from Conti 
and Overpeck. We simply find that Pavlik has met his 
burden of demonstrating that there is a disputed question 
of fact concerning what Stephen knew and thus whether 
additional information ex ante would have altered his 
course of conduct. We also note that while Pavlik has met 
his burden on summary judgment, he faces the more 
difficult burden of demonstrating causation to the jury at 
trial, and the evidence before us now might fall short of 
that mark. 
 
Powell does not command a different result. In that case, 
the plaintiff, a hospital nurse, was injured when a hand- 
tied restraining vest manufactured by the defendant and 
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designed to secure geriatric patients to a chair or bed was 
removed by a patient, causing the patient to fall. The 
plaintiff attempted to grab onto the patient as he fell, 
resulting in an injury to the plaintiff's back. She brought 
suit against the manufacturer for failure to adequately 
warn of the danger of the patient's ability to remove the 
vest by himself. 
 
Evidence in the record indicated that the hospital had a 
policy of using more secure restraining devices in addition 
to hand-tied vests only on patients who posed a threat of 
violence or escape. See Powell, 766 F.2d at 134. There was 
also testimony that the patient involved in the accident was 
not, at the time of the accident, a known threat. See id. 
Thus, even if the additional warning desired by the plaintiff 
in Powell had been affixed, there was no reason to believe 
that the plaintiff would have acted any differently since she 
produced no evidence that she would have diverged from 
hospital policy with this particular patient (i.e. used 
additional restraints on a non-threatening person) had she 
been warned that patients using the defendant's vest could 
untie themselves. See id. In short, although unlike Conti 
and Overpeck in that Powell does not pose a scenario in 
which the plaintiff was specifically aware of the complained- 
of danger, the record made clear that even had she known 
that patients could untie the defendant's vests themselves, 
she would not have acted differently. 
 
This case is far different from Powell because, as we have 
explained, the record is not unequivocal as to Stephen 
Pavlik's knowledge of the dangers posed by butane 
inhalation and his likely course of conduct. Unlike the 
defendant in Powell, which introduced the evidence of the 
hospital policy to demonstrate that (even with the benefit of 
a heeding presumption) plaintiff had not met her burden of 
persuasion on the causation issue, here the defendants 
have not directed us to similar evidence.7  Accordingly, 
Powell does not control. In sum, although a jury may not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Moreover, Pavlik has introduced evidence that indicates that warnings 
are heeded in the non-consumable products context presented by this 
case. Thomas J. Wallace, Ph.D., for example, has stated very plainly that 
"[e]ffective labels do warn and do deter." App. at 352. 
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find enough evidence here to find for Pavlik at trial, he has 
introduced at least enough to create a genuine issue of 
material fact precluding summary judgment. 
 
III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
 
The district court also granted defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on plaintiff's claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The court found no evidence 
in the record to support plaintiff's contention that 
defendants' conduct was "extreme and outrageous" or 
"beyond all bounds of decency." Op. at 11. We agree. 
 
As we have explained in prior opinions, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is cognizable 
under Pennsylvania law, see Kazatsky v. King David 
Memorial Park, Inc., 527 A.2d 988 (Pa. 1987) (leaving "to 
another day" whether this cause of action is viable in the 
Commonwealth), generating confusion among the courts 
that have been presented with this type of tort claim. 
Compare, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 
1469, 1486-87 (3d Cir. 1990), with Ford v. Isdaner, 542 
A.2d 137, 139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), and Small v. Juniata 
College, 682 A.2d 350, 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). We have 
consistently predicted, however, that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court will ultimately recognize this tort. See Trans 
Penn Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 
1995); Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 606 (3d Cir. 1990); 
see also Corbett v. Morgenstern, 934 F. Supp. 680, 683-84 
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting confusion caused by Kazatsky and 
our subsequent prediction). 
 
We have also predicted that Pennsylvania would generally 
follow the basic formulation of the tort found in S 46 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Trans Penn Wax, 50 
F.3d at 232. Section S 46 provides that: 
 
       One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
       intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
       distress to another is subject to liability for such 
       emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
       results from it for such bodily harm. 
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See also Small, 682 A.2d at 355 (citing  S 46). We have 
further held that S 46 liability will only be found where "the 
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of 
decency, as to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts S 46 cmt. d (cited in Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 991; 
Trans Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 232). This is a heavy burden 
for a plaintiff to meet, as recovery under S 46 has been 
"highly circumscribed". Kazatsky, 527 A.2d at 991. 
 
The thrust of plaintiff's S 46 claim is that Keen was 
aware that butane inhalation was widespread and deadly, 
but did nothing about it, while Lane was similarly put on 
notice and failed to make inquiries into this danger. We 
agree with the district court that the plaintiff has not 
adduced sufficient evidence (the sum and substance of 
which we have outlined in the margin) to justify afinding 
that either defendant's acts in this regard amount to 
outrageous conduct that is intolerable in a civilized society.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. With regard to Keen, plaintiff alleges that the company "refused" to 
participate in programs or take independent actions designed to alert the 
public to the dangers of inhalant abuse despite its knowledge of those 
dangers. To illustrate this, plaintiff points to Keen's "refusal" to 
contribute to a campaign of public interest television advertisements in 
the United Kingdom and its purported failure to comply with proposals 
made by Re-Solve, a manufacturer's association. The evidence in the 
record, however, indicates only (1) that Keen was "not asked" to 
contribute to the advertising campaign; and (2) that Keen offered 
revisions to Re-Solve's proposals and decided to take no action when Re- 
Solve did not respond. See App. at 385, 391-92. Plaintiff also argues 
that, in response to a set of five recommendations by a British 
government advisory council designed to curb butane inhalation abuse, 
Keen only chose to adopt the one measure that it believed could also 
prove profitable. See App. at 394, 396. While this may be true, and while 
perhaps the act of following only one of many recommendations 
proposed by an advisory group may appear suspect, we cannot conclude 
that this act in this instance constitutes outrageous conduct. 
 
The evidence against Lane, plaintiff contends, demonstrates a failure 
to "learn about or prevent death from butane inhalation" after Lane was 
sued in Massachusetts in 1989. However, it is unclear from the record 
what the precise allegations in the Massachusetts case were, and we 
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See Small, 682 A.2d at 355 (court must initially decide 
whether defendant's conduct was so extreme and 
outrageous that recovery may be justified). Accordingly, the 
district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants 
will be affirmed on plaintiff's intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim. However, as explained above, the 
order granting summary judgment on the failure to warn 
claim will be reversed, and the case remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings. 
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 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
could only speculate that the case arose out of similar facts to those 
alleged here. Moreover, the record only supports the conclusion that 
Lane viewed the Massachusetts case as an "isolated incident" that did 
not warrant further investigation. App. at 400. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that Lane was aware that butane was 
being used as an inhalant prior to that lawsuit, and nothing that 
suggests that Lane learned from that case that their present warnings 
were inadequate. Plaintiff also offers other evidence of Lane's alleged 
failure to inquire into the harmful effects of butane inhalation, 
including 
its alleged failure to question why Keen wanted to add the "DO NOT 
BREATHE SPRAY" language to the Zeus label in 1987-88, and its alleged 
failure to reevaluate the Zeus warning when other label changes were 
proposed in 1992. Once again, we find nothing in the record that 
demonstrates that Lane's knowledge of the butane abuse problem was 
such that these actions are indicative of outrageous conduct. 
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